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CONSTITUTIONAL RETROSPECT: THE FIRST SERIES OF
CUTLER LECTURES REVISITED
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER*
The original Cutler Lectures on the Constitution were estab-
lished under terms of a grant to the College of William and Mary
by the James Goold Cutler Foundation of Rochester, New York.
Part of the income from that grant supported an annual lecture
series by leading authorities on constitutional law. The series con-
tinued until 1944, when it fell into limbo. Thirty years later, the
original grant arrangement was altered to conform to the changed
curriculum focus of the College, and in 1981 the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law formally revived the lecture series. The first "new"
Cutler lecture, by R. Kent Greenawalt of the Columbia Law
School, is published below in this issue.
In the interest of scholarly continuity, a consideration of some of
the surviving propositions of the most important lectures in the
original series seemed appropriate. The original lectures were pub-
lished in the Bulletin of the College of William and Mary which
has long been out of print; therefore, some of the lectures ad-
dressed themselves to issues not of contemporary relevance. These
are included for historical interest in the calendar of the complete
series found in the appendix to this article.
Several of the lectures in the first series, however, have enduring
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significance, either as part of the intellectual inventory of those
lectures whose influence is still substantial, or as innovative pro-
positions of constitutionalism. This retrospect provides today's
student of constitutional principles with the opportunity to experi-
ence the contemporary viewpoints of those who were living
through some of the events that attracted political, constitutional,
and academic attention in a period when the United States moved
from the "decade of normalcy" through the Great Depression and
into the social and economic upheavals of the Second World War.1
These decades were an epochal transition period in American con-
stitutional history, as the economic consequences of the Depression
and World War II necessitated an abandonment of traditional lais-
sez-faire attitudes. The constitutional orientation of the United
States was changing inexorably in the course of these events, and if
the early Cutler lecturers were unaware of this, they hardly can be
charged with lack of prescience. The most that can be asked of
such persons is that they competently analyze the current subject
that they address in terms of the events leading up to it.
VIEWS OF THE PASSING SCENE
Somewhat ironically, Congressman James M. Beck of Penn-
sylvania chose as his title for the opening Cutler Lecture in 1927,
Our Changing Constitution. Beck had been Solicitor General of
the United States under President Harding and by 1935 would be
a vigorous critic of the New Deal. He viewed Harding's election in
1920, and William Howard Taft's nomination as Chief Justice of
the United States the following year, as events that signaled an
end to the reform legislation and what Taft called the "constitu-
tional latitudinal marginism" of the Progressive Era. Beck worried
in his lecture about the efforts of the progressives in Congress to
continue the reform drive. "Many laws are politically anti-consti-
tutional without being juridically unconstitutional," he warned,
and added, "Through this breach in the dike, a flood of legislation
wholly inconsistent with the spirit, and at times inconsistent with
1. This period has been described in detail in W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN
THE 20TH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932, 221-303 (1969); and W. SWINDLER, COURT
AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20m CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968, 1-1116 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as THE NEW LEGALITY].
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the letter, of the Constitution, constantly passes, and, being thus
accepted as law, the Constitution itself is slowly weakened."2
Even more retrospective than Beck's lecture was the second, by
former United States Attorney General George W. Wickersham, on
The Constitution and Prohibition Enforcement, in 1929. This sec-
ond lecturer, however, unknowingly offered a view of a much
broader and more serious issue that still confronts American life
today-the rise of interstate crime, particularly in urban America.
As Chairman of the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Wickersham helped document the rise of "rum run-
ning" and gangsterism that, according to the contemporary and
still substantially held view, flourished on public resistance to the
Prohibition Amendment. In his lecture, Wickersham expressed
concern at the tendency of Congress to react to increasing viola-
tions of the prohibition laws by enacting stricter statutes. In par-
ticular, Wickersham perceived the Jones Act' as an example of
congressional zeal to compel observance of the law that threatened
many fundamental constitutional rights.4
John H. Latane of the Walter Hines Page School of Interna-
tional Relations at the Johns Hopkins University gave the third
lecture, entitled The Constitution and Foreign Relations, in 1931.
Latane's lecture considered the relation between the "advise and
consent" function of the Senate and the machinery used for com-
mitting the United States to treaties and programs proffered by
other nations. For the most part, however, Latane confined himself
to the political history of this treaty ratification machinery.'
THE SEARCH FOR PERSPECTIVE
The Great Depression of the 1930's compelled some of the Cut-
ler lecturers to evaluate profound changes in American life and
constitutional thought both in terms of historical perspectives and
fundamental principles. Patrick J. Hurley, Herbert Hoover's Secre-
2. Beck, Our Changing Constitution, 21 BuLL. C. WM. & RY no. 2, at 29-30 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as WM. & MARY BULL.].
3. Ch. 473, 45 Stat. 1446 (1929).
4. Wickersham, The Constitution and Prohibition Enforcement, 23 WM. & AURY BULL.
no. 4, at 37-38 (1929).
5. Latane, The Constitution and Foreign Relations, 24 WM. & MARY BULL. no. 8, at 34-36
(1931).
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tary of War, praised the fundamentals in his 1932 lecture on The
Constitution and Current Economic Problems, and Newton D.
Baker, the political liaison between Woodrow Wilson's New Free-
dom and Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, offered a reappraisal
of older values in his 1934 lecture on The Making and Keeping of
the Constitution.
The two lecturers of this decade who seemed to discern the sig-
nificance of the changes that inexorably were coming about, and
who consequently warrant more extensive quotation, were the his-
torian William E. Dodd and the political scientist Harold J. Laski.
Dodd, of the University of Chicago, spoke on The Federal Consti-
tution and Its Application, 1789 to 1933. Sketching the develop-
ment of constitutional doctrine up to the close of the Civil War,
Dodd initially contended that the triumph of an industrial over an
agricultural economy produced a new American character.
Bankers everywhere doubted the ability of Lincoln to win the
war. Their interest in the cause was won, however, in the estab-
lishment of the third national banking system-a scheme which
enabled men with margins of profit to organize banks in every
city, purchase United States bonds at a heavy discount and then
issue bank notes up to ninety per cent of their face value. Every-
where men doubled and quadrupled their capital the next three
or four years. Financiers, American and European, thereafter
lent a hearty support to the "greatest democrat of the age."
Within ten years the bankers procured hostile legislation against
state banks and gradually organized themselves into an associa-
tion which was able in the decades that followed to guide the
savings of every section into the vaults of New York banks. Nor
was there any strict governmental supervision of a system in
which the surpluses of the whole Union were so deeply involved.
The financiers had at last acquired a position in the Federal
economy which far surpassed that of Nicholas Biddle and equal-
led that of the slaveholders in 1860; a great oligarchy without
effective governmental supervision-government once more of
the "rich, the wise and the good."'
The concentration of postwar economic power in the financiers,
6. Dodd, The Federal Constitution and its Application, 1789 to 1933, 27 WM. & MARY
BULL. no. 5, at 31 (1933).
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Dodd continued, meant that they could influence Congress to re-
sume the protective tariffs that had been lowered in the 1840's,
and also to fund the great railroad-building that helped to funnel
the raw materials and agricultural produce of the rest of the nation
into the manufacturing and exporting centers of the East. For the
rest of the nineteenth century, Dodd declared, "all the greater in-
dustrial units were so associated that they either broke down do-
mestic competition or were able so to control prices and markets as
to compel minor competitors to take orders from their greater
fellows." 7
This laissez-faire influence upon constitutional thought contin-
ued for more than half a century after the Civil War despite occa-
sional efforts to regulate "rampant capitalism." The Progressive
movement, which climaxed in the first Wilson administration and
then evanesced into the First World War, was in Dodd's view
a return to the semi-free trade policy of 1846; the masterful as-
sociation of national bankers, unhindered in their exploitive op-
erations since the beginnings in 1863, was compelled to accept
some governmental control under the Federal Reserve System of
1913; and there was some effort to apply the trust regulation
ordered in the law of 1890.8
The reaction to the Progressive movement after the First World
War, however, began a decade of "normalcy" under Warren Har-
ding, a President "even more ignorant than the most ignorant of
his predecessors," and continued under those who followed him in
the White House. "Thus, instead of moving into new paths as
Washington had done in 1787-88 and Lincoln had repeated in
1861, the leaders of the United States faced backward from 1921 to
1929. '"10 The stock market collapse in 1929 ended a politico-eco-
nomic system that had been unchallenged for most of the time
since 1860; therefore, Dodd stressed, a new application of the Con-
stitution was required. The orientation toward Jeffersonian agrari-
anism, the frame of reference for the instrument of 1787, needed a
new direction in the increasingly integrated, interstate, industrial
7. Id. at 33.
8. Id. at 43.
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 54-55.
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economy that followed the implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The new industrial democracy needed a regulatory
process that "only a minority of [even] the Hamilton party would
have tolerated in 1789; . . . [t]he old constitution must be made
new and no constitution could be made successful, without many
and intimate contacts with the industrial world everywhere."11
Dodd, speaking halfway through the New Deal, could not de-
scribe the ultimate shape of the new constitutional order; he sim-
ply perceived that change was inevitable in the twentieth century.
He concluded confidently:
These are the greater leads on the way to the new world, the
new United States operating under the reinterpreted constitu-
tion of Washington and his fellows. The minor problems may be
worked out more slowly. But it must be a new world, a new atti-
tude toward constitutions and a recognition that privileged
groups always work their own ruin, if not regulated by govern-
ment; and working their own ruin, they work that of their fel-
lows in vast numbers. The United States have gone a long way
since 1865, a longer way since 1787; but a vaster future is still
before us and the principle of democracy is as vital today as in
1776.12
Laski, the great political scientist of the London School of Eco-
nomics, addressed, on the eve of World War Ii, the issue of the
impact of emergency government power upon the Anglo-American
tradition of personal liberty in The Prospects of Democratic Gov-
ernment. Because this particular lecture was widely read, quoted,
and debated on both sides of the Atlantic, it is worth quoting here
in some length. The speaker, conscious of the provocative nature of
his writings, began by acknowledging that "nothing is gained by
the denial that, all over the world, democratic societies are chal-
lenged to justify their existence."1 Like a number of the previous
lecturers, Laski then invited a look back at first principles, but
from his perspective.
Democracy is not merely a form of government; it is also a
11. Id. at 45, 65.
12. Id. at 68-69.




way of life. It is an insistence upon the eminent and inherent
worth of the common man. It is an attempt, therefore, to find
the institutions through which that worth may attain its full ex-
pression. We cannot cofine those institutions to the political
field. It is no use giving to the common man the power to define
his own destiny, and then to rule out portions of the field of life
as inadmissible to his entrance. If democracy is valid in the po-
litical realm, then it is valid in social life and economic life. If
the common man is to be free, then, throughout the pattern of
existence, he must be guaranteed the necessary conditions of
freedom. He cannot be free while he suffers from economic inse-
curity. He cannot be free if he lacks the intellectual weapons
which will enable him to find his way about the world, to make
effectively articulate his experience of life, to be certain that his
experience will count in the making of decisions. He cannot be
free unless he can find either significance in his daily work, or,
alternatively, enjoy a leisure which he is able to use for creative
ends. He cannot, finally, be free unless he is certain that the
rules under which he lives are shaped in terms of a genuine and
continuous consideration of the demands he has to make upon
the stock of common welfare. These are the values to the impor-
tance of which all history of which we are aware has borne testi-
mony. These, too, are the values today so widely challenged. Our
business is not merely their reaffirmation. Our business also is
the statement of the conditions upon which they can be success-
fully reaffirmed.
I do not believe that democracy can be maintained in an une-
qual society. Men think differently who live differently; and in a
society where men live as differently as with ourselves, there is
an absence of that unity of thought about fundamentals which is
fatal to the power of reason to maintain its empire over the
minds of men. That inequality has led to a regime of privilege
which divides the commonwealth into a small group of conquer-
ors and a great mass of hewers of wood and drawers of water to
whom life offers no prospect of rich fulfillment. Because they
live so differently, they draw their notions of good and evil, right
and wrong, from the way they live; and there is no bond of effec-
tive common understanding between them. In such a world, as
Hobbes said, they stand in the posture of armed gladiators the
one to the other. Neither group feels secure; neither group is ca-
pable of tolerance because it is insecure. They are afraid; and
where men are afraid passions are aroused which destroy their
capacity to settle their argument by consent. It is only where
1981]
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men feel that they are granted an equal claim or, alternatively,
that the differences in response to claim are capable of rational
justification in terms of function, that they will maintain the
foundations of an ordered society.14
Although political freedom was the ideal of both Jefferson and
Hamilton, Laski urged recognition of the economic freedom which
now translated into economic equality of the parties in the produc-
tion process. He cited Justice Holmes' remark that "liberty of con-
tract begins where equality of bargaining power begins,' and
added
Those who have challenged the democratic way of life, always in
the interest of an unequal society, have deliberately denied all
those values which, since the Reformation, men have been striv-
ing to make an established part of the common inheritance. The
issue of our time is whether the denial is to be universal; or
whether it is still possible to arrest the extension of its
authority.
This phenomenon of fear is not new in history; it has accom-
panied all profound social changes, and has made most ages of
social reconstruction ages of fear and of violence. Our problem is
the grave one that violence in our own age makes the very sur-
vival of civilization a doubtful matter. We have had conflicts
before for liberty. But this is the first time in history in which a
conflict for liberty has been set in the context of equality. That
is the inner and ultimate significance of the battle that is raging
now. An economic system has passed its apogee. It is no longer
capable of satisfying the established expectations of the masses.
They therefore seek-it is wholly intelligible that they should
seek-such a transformation of its foundations as shall make its
potentialities available to themselves. They take the view that
the power of the state should be invoked to mitigate the conse-
quences of social and economic inequality. If they cannot
achieve that by the normal means of a given constitutional or-
ganization, they will be driven to extra-constitutional means to
attain it. They have begun to understand that contemporary civ-
ilization is disfigured at every point by needless suffering-in
14. Id. at 4-6.
15. Id. at 6.
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deprivation of health; in lack of economic security; in standards
of life; in cultural opportunity. They cannot see that those who
enjoy those things are those who are entitled to enjoy them by
reason of the contribution they directly make to social well-be-
ing. What, therefore, they ask is simple in essence, even if it is
momentous in consequence.
They ask that the democracy which has, with all its faults,
proved so liberating an influence on the political plane should be
extended to the economic plane also. They realize that, in a civi-
lization like our own, the fulfillment of personality is impossible
without that extension. Freedom without equality is, as they in-
creasingly understand, a name of noble sound and squalid re-
sult. A society, in a word, which trusts its whole fortunes to the
profit making motive must be enormously successful if it is to
obtain the allegience of its citizens. It must be able continuously
to translate its success into the perceptible terms of their mate-
rial welfare. It must give them, in the realm of the spirit, the
sense that they share in the mastery of their own lives.16
CRISIS AS THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE
Two years after Laski, the American philosopher Max Lerner
delivered his lecture on The Constitution and the Crisis State, a
title he said epitomized his observations "on the relation of consti-
tutional crisis to the democratic state of today."
There have been three major types of constitutional crisis in
our history. You get one type when there is a sharp discrepancy
between the needs of effective government on the one hand and
on the other the limits of tolerance imposed by the Supreme
Court on the policy (generally economic policy) of the govern-
ment. You can, if you wish, put it into somewhat Freudian
terms: the id, or driving part of the governmental psyche, wants
desperately to follow certain lines of action; the superego, or the
censor in the shape of the Supreme Court, says No. If the cleav-
age between the two is acute enough, you get breakdown.
The second type of crisis, generally linked to the first, comes
when there is a frontal attack (or counter-attack) on the judicial
power, whether on the part of Congress or the President, gener-
ally (although not necessarily) in order to make it more respon-
16. Id. at 7-9.
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sive to the popular consciousness of the time. In this sort of cri-
sis the desire for a realignment of Supreme Court policy clashes
with the sense of the need for retaining judicial independence of
political change, and with the related sense of the Constitution
as a basic protection of our liberties and of the Supreme Court
as having a guardian-role toward the Constitution.
The third type comes when the Constitution, in emergencies,
is actually stretched beyond its usual bounds, and where the un-
wonted stretching, necessary though it may be, raises questions
of the breakdown of the whole constitutional fabric. This gener-
ally occurs in periods of military emergency, as during the Civil
War, the World War, and the present one, and relates generally
to the expansion of Presidential power.17
Lerner anticipated the continuing pressure of the economic and
military emergency that a later generation would define as the
problem of an "imperial Presidency"; and he argued that the whole
course of national and world history in the twentieth century cre-
ated this condition. The constitutional issue for the remainder of
the century, he declared, would be "mainly over the limits of polit-
ical action and the lines of the distribution of power." 18
One of the difficult but exciting things about the democratic
crisis state is that it must carry on under democratic forms in a
world that is abandoning them. And this paradox becomes par-
ticularly acute in wartime. Although I shall not discuss our for-
eign policy from the angle of its merits, it is important to note
that we are today committed to full aid to the anti-Nazi nations.
What does that mean in governmental terms? It means we must
fulfill the conditions of modern warfare to survive, just as in the
domestic crisis we had to fulfill the conditions of modern eco-
nomic and administrative strategy to survive.
The problem here, as in the crisis of 1935-1938, is again one of
the dominant need of governmental effectiveness if we are to
survive, as against an inflexibility of governmental doctrine and
machinery. But the differences are important. The struggle is
not primarily in the economic but in the political realm. The
17. Lerner, The Constitution and the Crisis State, 35 Wm. & MARY BULL. no. 7, at 4
(1941).
18. Id. at 7.
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difficulties do not center in the Supreme Court but in the rela-
tion of the President to Congress and sections of public opinion.
The ideological minus-symbols that are in use are not those of
(economic) socialism but of (political) dictatorship; and the op-
posite plus-symbols are not judicial authority but civil liberties
and political survival.1
This deserves a word. For we have allowed our thinking about
democracy and dictatorship to become thin, smug, and superfi-
cial. We judge them in quantitative terms, as if we were grocers
weighing our potatoes. Dictatorship means great power, we say;
democracy, little power. Dictatorship means concentrated
power, democracy, safely dispersed and divided power. But to
say and think that is to fall victim to the great tragic fallacy of
our age. For it is not true that to survive a democracy must be
weak. In any form of government, power must be adequate to
the tasks placed on it. And in any form of government, power
must be concentrated as far as may be necessary for survival.20
The challenge to political tenets offered by Laski and Lerner,
interspersed with a relatively conventional lecture on federal-state
relations by legal historian Charles Warren,2 1 was followed by an-
other orthodox lecture by James T. Shotwell in 1942. Shotwell, his-
torian and international affairs specialist at Columbia University,
spoke on The Constitution and the Guarantee of Freedom. A can-
did call for a return to the world of James Beck and George Wick-
ersham was issued the following year by John Dickinson, general
counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad. The cycle of lectures had
come full circle in the gathering intellectual mists of midwar 1944.
From the first to the last, they reflected a sense of change and
evanesence of old political values, both domestic and international;
and in another sense, they identified the unstable ground upon
which American constitutionalism has treaded ever since.2
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. Id. at 15-20.
21. Warren, The Supreme Court and Disputes Between States, 34 WM. & MARY BULL.
no. 5 (1941). See generally C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911); C. WARREN,
Tr SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923).
22. See THE NEw LEGALITY, supra note 1, at 117-353.
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APPENDIX
James Goold Cutler Lectures on the Constitution:
First Series, 1927-1944
The lectures were originally published as numbers in the Bulle-
tin of the College of William and Mary in Virginia. They are
listed below in chronological order, with the number and date of
the Bulletin.
Our Changing Constitution, by James M. Beck; Vol. 21, No. 2
(1927).
The Constitution and Prohibition Enforcement, by George W.
Wickersham; Vol. 23, No. 4 (1929).
The Constitution and Foreign Relations, by John Holladay
Latane; Vol. 24, No. 2 (1931).
The Appointing and Removal Power of the President Under the
Constitution of the United States, by Guy Despard Goff; Vol. 25,
No. 3 (1931).
The Federal Constitution and Its Application, 1789 to 1933, by
William E. Dodd; Vol. 27, No. 5 (1933).
The Constitution and Current Economic Problems, by Patrick
J. Hurley; Vol. 27, No. 4 (1933).*
The Making and Keeping of the Constitution, by Newton Diehl
Baker; Vol. 28, No. 2 (1935).
The Constitution as a Continuing Principle in Government, by
Ethelbert Warfield; Vol. 30, No. 1 (1936).
A Comparison of Executive and Judicial Powers under the Con-
stitutions of Argentina and the United States, by Alexander W.
Weddell; Vol. 31, No. 5 (1937).
The Crisis of the American Constitution, by William Y. Elliot;
Vol. 32, No. 5 (1938).
The Prospects of Democratic Government, by Harold J. Laski;
Vol. 33, No. 4 (1939).
The Supreme Court and Disputes Between States, by Charles
Warren; Vol. 34, No. 5 (1940).
The Constitution and the Crisis State, by Max Lerner; Vol. 35,
No. 7 (1941).
The Constitution and the Guarantee of Freedom, by James T.
* Published out of order.
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Shotwell; Vol. 36, No. 5 (1942).
Planned Society, by John Dickinson; Vol. 37, No. 4 (1943).
Constitutional Aspects of Foreign Affairs, by Lindsay Rogers
(1944).t
t Published as a separate pamphlet.
1981]
